Source
The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy
George Cooper, 2008
George Cooper, who worked as a fund manager at Goldman Sachs and as a strategist for Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan, wrote The Origin of Financial Crises (2008) as the credit crisis unfolded. Its argument is that financial markets do not behave as the efficient market hypothesis says. In markets for assets and credit, rising prices bring more borrowing, and more borrowing pushes prices higher: a self-reinforcing spiral of asset prices and debt.
He traces how banking and the creation of money came to need central banks, and draws on Hyman Minsky's view that stability breeds instability and on Benoit Mandelbrot's work on fat tails. His charge against central banks, the Federal Reserve above all, is asymmetry: the response to a boom is weak and late, the response to a bust is violent and early, so each cycle ends with more debt than the last. He sees the same error in Japan, where the borrowing binge of the 1980s was followed by thirteen years of interest rates at or near zero.
The appendix reprints James Clerk Maxwell's 1868 paper βOn Governors,β on the devices that keep a steam engine at a steady speed. Cooper argues that a central bank should act as such a governor on credit creation, in both directions, and calls for an end to inflation targeting as the sole aim of policy.
Events it covers
- 2007β2009 Financial crisis
- 1985β1990 Japanese asset bubble